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Abstract:
Variation persists in the quality of board level leadership of hospitals. 
The consequences of poor leadership can be catastrophic for patients. 
 The year 2019 marks 50 years of public inquiries into healthcare failures 
in the UK. The aim of this article is to enhance our understanding of 
context-specific effectiveness of healthcare board practices, drawing on 
an empirical study of changes in hospital board leadership in England. 
 The study suggests leadership behaviours that lay the conditions for 
better organisation performance. We locate our findings within the wider 
theoretical debates about corporate governance, responding to calls for 
theoretical pluralism, and insights into the effects of discretionary effort 
on the part of board members. We conclude by proposing a framework 
for the ‘restless’ board from a multi-theoretic standpoint, and suggest a 
repertoire specifically for healthcare boards. This comprises a suite of 
board roles as conscience of the organisation, sensor, shock absorber, 
diplomat and coach, with accompanying dyadic behaviours to match 
particular organisation aims and priorities. The repertoire indicates the 
importance of a cluster of leadership practices to fulfil the purposes of 
healthcare boards in differing, complex and challenging contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION
The public sector board has social performance and the creation of public value as its two 
central purposes.1 Created for public boards, Carver’s policy governance model enables 
boards to govern by making values explicit, and by having a board member focus, in line 
with agency theory, entirely on ends, not on means; the latter being, in Carver’s view, the job 
of management. The intended effect is more authoritative boards, as well as more empowered 
management.2 The events at Stafford hospital in England are arguably an unintended effect of 
this position: the board there was deemed to be distant from, and largely unaware of, the daily 
realities in the hospital, with attention primarily on financial strategy.3, 4 
The normative position, in many jurisdictions, including in the NHS in England, since the 
advent of New Public Management (NPM) principles, is that public sector boards now 
largely follow the example set by the commercial sector.5 There has been some concern 
expressed that there can be transferability problems and issues of institutional isomorphism,6 
in this case when governance structures and processes are copied without regard to their 
relevance to the public sector context. 
The corporate board is used in many healthcare systems as the model of governance for 
public hospitals,1 on the basis of its combination of executive and non-executive, internal and 
independent, professional and lay contributions, and the requirement for diverse perspectives 
and skills to be brought together in order to reach collective decisions in the best interests of 
the organisation, its strategy, and operational accountability. In the NHS in England, 
particular attention has been paid to hospital boards following the report of the public inquiry 
into Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust in 2013 (the Francis Report)4 that concluded 
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that it was the board of the Trust that bore ultimate accountability for failings in quality and 
safety of care.
This paper draws on findings from empirical research undertaken in the NHS in England 
which sought to detect and understand changes in hospital board leadership made in the wake 
of the Francis Report. The motivation lies in the potential to secure generalisable insights into 
the ingredients of effective healthcare board roles and behaviours, drawing from existing 
theoretical public board governance frameworks, and empirical findings from this study.   We 
concentrate on two research questions within that study: first, what does theory and empirical 
evidence from this study tell us about an appropriate range of roles for healthcare boards in 
the context of the NHS? Second, what are the associated behaviours connected with these 
roles? To address these questions, we examine the relevant literature on the role of boards 
within healthcare organisations, drawing on combined and complementary theoretical 
perspectives of board composition, roles and dynamics, with a particular focus on the 
interplay of these with the quality and safety of care provided by hospitals. We then go on to 
describe the study design and selected empirical findings related to the two questions outlined 
above. We structure our findings by, first, identifying variations in enactment of roles and 
behaviours, second, outlining the impacts and effects of board  practices, and third, surfacing 
enablers and barriers to improving leadership. We conclude by proposing a set of 
theoretically informed roles for diligent, dynamic and restless boards in the healthcare sector 
and a repertoire of board behaviours that are connected with these roles, to inform a refreshed 
theoretical framework for healthcare board leadership practice. We start by outlining the 
healthcare board governance context, with specific reference to the NHS.
BOARDS IN HEALTHCARE ORGANISATIONS AND IN THE NHS
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In the healthcare setting, there are multiple stakeholders including patients, staff, 
healthcare professions, regulators, funders and government. This constrains the power of the 
board both in relation to setting strategy, and in monitoring and improving performance, but 
does not absolve it from responsibility for assuring safe, high quality and effective patient 
care.
There are various structures in different countries in use for hospital boards, including 
non-executive trustee-style boards, unitary boards, two-tier boards and four-part governance 
arrangements. Under the influence of NPM (see for example Ferlie et al.5) these structures 
have generally changed to mirror more closely the private sector style board, and with 
stronger devolved accountability. 
In the case of England, since 1990 NHS hospital boards have been modelled on the private 
sector unitary board concept, with around eleven to fourteen members including a non-
executive chair, chief executive, executive directors and a majority of appointed 
(independent) non-executive directors (NEDs); all members of the board have collective 
responsibility for hospital performance. 
Following the extensively documented failings of care at the Mid-Staffordshire Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust, Robert Francis QC identified five main areas on which all NHS 
organisations needed to focus, led by their boards, namely: ensuring fundamental quality 
standards; enabling a culture of openness, transparency and candour; having a comprehensive 
set of nursing standards; patient-centred leadership; and making good use of timely 
information to assess performance.4 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Itt has been argued that behaviours can be related to the sometimes unconscious alignment of 
individual members to the different theories about corporate governance.7 These theories 
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have been well-rehearsed elsewhere.8-13 Agency theory, which is based on the belief that 
shareholders’ or stakeholders’ interests are likely to be at variance with managers’ interests, 
is associated with a challenging and defending set of behaviours in the boardroom. 
Stewardship theory, on the other hand, with its notion of a shared and common agenda, puts a 
premium on a high trust and collaborative style of working. In resource dependency theory, 
the main job of the board is to maximise the benefits of external dependencies which favours 
outward looking and ambassadorial type behaviours. From a stakeholder theory perspective, 
the importance of the representation of different communities of interest is prioritised, with a 
resulting consensus-building behavioural orientation. Finally, in relation to the sources and 
use of board power, managerial hegemony posits that in practice the managers, sometimes in 
combination with or responding to external agencies, make most of the decisions, with the 
rest of the board relegated to a rubber stamping role.
Recent thinking suggests that rather than one or other of the theories being, in general, 
superior or preferred, context and desired outcomes should guide which theory (or 
combination) and related mechanisms best fit the circumstances. As Erwin et al. suggest,14 
depending on the hospital or health system’s mission or strategic goals, certain types of 
boards or board processes might be preferred and researchers should continue to study boards 
with this perspective in mind. For this study we therefore draw on a realist-informed 
interpretation framework for healthcare boards as outlined in Table 1. This outlines the five 
different combinations for boards in relation to theories listed in the paragraph above, their 
contextual assumptions, the mechanisms used by boards and their intended outcomes. The 
framework posits that an underlying belief in the primary board purpose and the prevailing 
context is likely to drive the choice of mechanisms to achieve the board’s objectives and 
intended organisation outcomes. Realists suggest that exposing not only the mechanisms of 
change in an intervention, but more importantly their relationship to the context of 
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implementation is key to the evaluation of complex programmes.15 We use this approach as 
the starting point for our search for a hospital board behaviour repertoire. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In line with the theoretical pluralism advocated by Roberts, McNulty and Stiles,10 this 
position proposes that having an orientation towards a particular board purpose brings with it 
the likelihood of a varying set of priorities, which then relate to different organisational 
performance outcomes,1 as indicated in Table 1. The gap in the literature, as exemplified by 
tThis framework, is that does not however, as it stands, there is no explicit consideration 
ofexplicitly include a consideration of board practices that have an influence, as mechanisms, 
on these different purposes and desired outcomes. Veronesi and Keasey, for example, found 
that the dominance of the healthcare ‘expert’ board (that is composed largely of healthcare 
professionals and insiders) led to behaviours that often precluded post-NPM behavioural 
norms of flexibility, responsiveness, listening and collaboration with wider stakeholders.16 
Lee et al. confirm previous findings that many hospital boards are not fulfilling their expected 
roles as described in the literature.17 In an extensive US-focused review of hospital board 
governance research since 1990, Erwin et al. found that the occupational background of 
board members influenced choice of focus, behavioural dynamics and the need for training to 
fulfil quality of care monitoring.14 
The work and functioning of boards is thus empirically variable, not only as conditioned 
by composition and external forces, but also by board processes and the deployment of the 
will and skill of individual board members, minimalist and maximalist board practices, and 
locked-in routines.18-21 This line of research from the authors listed above emphasises board 
effort as discretionary, with board members having a choice to work more or less hard in the 
enactment of their role. 
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Lynall and colleagues argue that board activities are subject to path dependency and a 
reflection of the relative power and influence of the CEO and external parties at the time of 
formation.22 Other work has focused on board behaviours13, 23 and in particular ‘dyadic 
behaviours’,23-25 where apparently paradoxical issues need to be resolved by a board, and in 
so doing require multiple skills to enable the work of the board to be achieved in an 
appropriately sensitive and reflexive manner. Recent work has developed the concept of the 
‘triadic’ board, where board leadership combines robust challenge of and strong support for 
the executive with significant engagement on the part of the board with internal and external 
stakeholders.1
Roberts et al. emphasised that board accountability is actualised by a whole range of 
behaviours that are only visible at close range.10 Van Puyvelde et al., for example, found that 
boards of nursing homes experienced a simultaneous need to both control and collaborate 
with their managers.25 They argue there is a governance tension in combining these two 
different roles as it requires boards to behave in very different ways: the controlling role is 
more reactive and includes careful monitoring and scrutiny, and collaborating is more 
proactive and requires visioning and a broader understanding of the organisation and its 
environment. The gap in the literature is thus an Research is called for to better understanding 
of the effects of minimalist and maximalist board practices or discretionary board effort (as 
described by Pettigrew and McNulty,19 and how dyadic cycles of supportive and controlling, 
trusting and challenging board behaviours can be self-correcting and lead to better 
organisation performance.23 The focus of this paper is how such greater understanding could 
enhance the theoretical framework for effective unitary healthcare boards (Figure 1) that is 
our starting point. 
We now report on a mixed-methods study that sought to open up the ‘black box’ of board 
practices within the healthcare sector in the NHS in England.26 We ask, first, what does 
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theory, and empirical evidence from this study, tell us about an appropriate range of roles for 
boards in the context of the NHS, and, second, what are the associated behaviours connected 
with these roles. Along the way we investigated how board practices reflected the different 
theories (Table 1), to better understand dyadic combinations of behaviours, and possible 
barriers to productive combination. Our aim was to understand better the differential impact 
of discretionary board effort, or minimalist and maximalist board practices19 and how cycles 
of supportive and controlling, and trusting and challenging board behaviours can be self-
correcting and lead to better organisation performance,23 and how this could enhance the 
proposed theoretical framework for effective unitary healthcare boards. To achieve this, the 
research examined the behaviours of hospital boards in relation to effective organisational 
leadership and shaping organisational culture, and identified ways that enable boards to 
prioritise patient safety (reducing the risk of harm), improving the experience of care (the 
collaborative effort between patient and clinician) and enhancing the clinical effectiveness of 
care (the capability for service improvement). All of which were key themes in the Francis 
Report.4
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS
For the purposes of this paper, which is to advance our theoretical understanding 
specifically about healthcare board roles and behaviours we report in particular on the 
findings in relation to these matters. 
Given the intrinsic complexity of the contribution of board roles and behaviours to 
effective healthcare governance, the research adopted a multi-method approach, with four 
different phases, and integrating qualitative and quantitative elements to examine these 
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relationships in both breadth and depth (see Figure 1). The different sources of data also 
enabled triangulation to take place to strengthen the development of theoretical propositions 
about healthcare board roles and behaviours.
To ensure that the study was grounded in the most recent theoretical and empirical 
governance scholarship and was cognisant of current policy developments, we carried out an 
initial scoping study (Phase 1) which included thirteen stakeholder interviews with national-
level stakeholders and opinion leaders. To capture the breadth of associations between recent 
board actions and care quality, we conducted a national survey identifying the range of 
measures taken by hospitals in response to recommendations in the Francis Report and 
subsequent national guidance (Phase 2). This survey, with 381 responses, gathered mainly 
quantifiable data to map connections between perceived board purposes and impacts, 
including barriers to action and contextual influences. To contribute depth, we used 
comparative case study methods and qualitative approaches to explore the detailed 
implementation and effects of recent actions of boards in six hospital trusts (Phase 3). This 
included a survey of ward and department managers in three of the case study trusts. The 
final phase was to analyse separately and then synthesise the findings from the three earlier 
phases to produce a set of practical, evidence-based and theoretically-informed learning 
points for boards.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Scoping work involved 13 interviews (four by phone and nine face to face) with key 
individuals from national organisations representing patients, medical and nursing 
professions, healthcare regulators, policy think tanks and Department of Health 
representatives. eliciting views on current concerns for boards, actions expected to have been 
taken as a result of the Francis Inquiry, the perceived and actual role of boards in overseeing 
and improving care quality and safety, the desirable characteristics of healthcare boards and 
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the barriers to improving board-level leadership in the NHS. The interviews were either 
recorded or extensive notes taken and thematically analysed.
The purpose of the survey was to gather mainly quantifiable data about boards and how 
members see the board impacting on the organisation, including changes since the 
publication of the Francis Report in February 2013. We surveyed CEOs, chairs, chief nurses, 
directors of finance, medical directors, non-executive directors, and board secretaries 
between December 2015 and May 2016. We asked questions about: 
1. Specific actions to improve board and organisational leadership (e.g. new policies, 
processes) 
2. Perceived impacts on intermediate outcomes (e.g. organisational strategies, structures, 
culture) and on organisational performance  
3. Perceptions of the connections between actions and impacts, including underlying 
mechanisms, barriers faced and contextual influences. 
A mix of tick box and free text responses were sought in order to facilitate both 
comparative statistical analyses and an understanding of underlying issues and the influence 
of contextual factors. We were aware of needing to keep the questionnaire short because 
board members have many demands on their time and because of evidence of association 
between length of survey questionnaires and diminishing response rates.27
381 respondents completed the survey (20% response rate). At least one response was 
received from 139 (90%) of the 154 NHS hospital trusts and foundation trusts in England at 
that time.
We purposively selected six case studies using criteria for maximising the range that were 
agreed at the stakeholder workshop convened to refine our research approach. These included 
geographical variation, a mix of larger teaching hospital and smaller district hospital trusts, 
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single and multi-site, greater or lesser stability of board membership, higher and lower 
performing organisations (as determined by the Care Quality Commission and Trust 
Development Authority assessments), foundation and non-foundation trusts and at least one 
specialist acute trust. We used a comparative case-study design to generalise theoretically 
from within and between cases.28 While each case has its own integrity in terms of theory 
building and generating policy implications, we developed common themes across sites using 
comparative case study methods and pattern matching.29, 30
Data collection methods for case study work included semi-structured interviews with 
executive and non-executive board members of trusts, commissioners, staff representatives, 
patient groups and the trust board secretary. A minimum of 12 interviews took place in each 
case study site, supplemented by two governors, patient and staff focus group discussions or a 
series of individual in-depth interviews per site. We also observed one public board meeting 
and one meeting of governors in each site and a number of board committees, using these to 
inform our understanding of local board and organisational dynamics. We undertook 
documentary analysis of board papers, trust annual plans and reports (including about staff 
engagement and development, and patient and public involvement), materials related to board 
development activities, data on board and organisational development and quality accounts. 
In interviews and focus group discussions, we explored knowledge and views of board 
initiatives taken in response to the Francis Inquiry. These included assessments of the 
relevance, usefulness, and impact of such actions, costs in terms of staff and others’ time, 
barriers encountered and thoughts about how best to improve further the governance and 
leadership of the board and trust. In addition, we were able to administer an online survey 
questionnaire to middle managers (ward and department managers) at three out of the six 
case study sites. Two of the others declined to participate, and in the remaining trust the 
response rate was too low for completed questionnaires to be considered for analysis. The 
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survey was based on items in our national board-level survey. A particular aim was to elicit 
qualitative responses from a wider population to supplement the interviews and focus groups. 
Therefore we included many free-text-response items.
All interviews and focus group discussions or notes were fully transcribed and we used 
qualitative coding software (Dedoose) to facilitate data storage and retrieval in analysis. All 
members of the research team were involved in generating coding frames for themes from 
qualitative data, and we carried out an exercise to compare independent coding of a subset of 
data to identify and address coding differences and ensure consistency. As part of our testing 
of emerging themes and for checking external validity we offered to present our findings at a 
board meeting.  Three case study sites responded to our invitation to feed back, thus helping 
us refine our final report.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
We now report selected findings from the study, highlighting those results that relate to the 
focus of this paper We draw on identified variations in enactment of roles and behaviours, the 
impacts and effects of board practices, and enablers and barriers to improving leadership, in 
order to propose an enhancement to current theoretical understandings of roles and 
behaviours for effective healthcare board governance.
Variations in enactment of roles and behaviours 
The first phase comprised interviews with key national-level stakeholders and opinion 
leaders. In terms of focus, there were four main areas of board working that were considered 
by opinion leaders to be crucial. First was a palpable concentration of effort towards ensuring 
patient-centred care. Second was the need to support staff, heed concerns and provide 
Page 11 of 63 Health Services Management Research
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Proof
12
protection from negative pressures. A close alignment between what the board says and what 
staff say about what is going on in the organisation was a good indicator of a positive 
organisation culture. Third was the importance of enabling a climate for compassionate care, 
insisting on certain behaviours and ensuring good governance. Running through all these was 
the priority that should be accorded to quality, safety and learning for improvement, and, as 
one informant quoted from Dixon-Woods et al. “more problem-sensing than comfort-
seeking” (p.114),31 ensuring that the quest for assurance is balanced with a drive for 
improvement. Underpinning this effort, our informants told us that the board should be 
receiving detailed and timely data on patient and staff concerns, ensuring that quality 
improvement is hardwired through organisation, and using good quality data and information 
as the basis for improvement.
Reflecting the expectations of our opinion leader informants, the findings from the 
national survey (Phase 2) demonstrated the strength of ambition of NHS board members to 
make cultural changes in the wake of the Francis Report. This ambition was mirrored in our 
six case study sites (Phase 3). There was, however, variation in the extent to which these 
ambitions were realised. We relate the effects of this variable achievement of board aims to 
our conceptualisation of board leadership characteristics, practices and behaviours in the 
discussion section.
What contextual influences accounted for some of these differences? Variations in the 
perceived quality of middle management, teamworking, the embeddedness of quality 
improvement, the stability of board membership, and the self-perceived strategic competence 
of the board were connected in three of the case study organisations which were on an 
improving trajectory, in regulatory terms. In two of these cases there were also reported 
concerns about the robustness of governance systems and processes. This indicates the 
sustained hard work, over an extended period of time, that is involved in the leadership effort 
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to take organisations out of trouble. The discussion section below offers further insights into 
the effects of these and other, different, board leadership characteristics and behaviours.
Impacts of board leadership practices and behaviours
In the national survey and case studies many respondents mentioned the influence of the 
Francis Report in changing the focus of their board’s attention:
It became ‘OK’ to talk about the patients and their care much more, the old adage of 
strategy as being the ‘in’ thing was actually eaten by the understanding that the right 
culture is what is really important. Looking after your patients but equally looking 
after your staff, communication, engagement, empowerment were all important 
previously, however post Francis this was ‘accepted’ as what we must do and it was 
not optional. [Chief Nurse]
There were limits to board adherence to the ethos of patient-centredness of care, however. 
Though the average scores are high for knowledge about patients and their families, and 
about staff, respondents felt they had the most knowledge about what was important to 
regulators (Wilcoxon signed rank test p<0.01). The proposed board role of being the 
conscience of the organisation which we outline in more detail below draws on this finding.
In relation to knowing what mattered to hospital staff, we found much effort had been 
invested in improving staff engagement. Sometimes the starting point was low, as one 
medical director remarked, when s/he first came into post “Nobody told them they were good 
at anything”. The reported impact of these efforts varied across our case study sites. One of 
the inhibiting factors was the empowerment of the middle-management cadre. In some of our 
case study sites, the onus lay too heavily on the executive tier. A further issue commented on 
by some staff was a lack of discipline and consistency in internal governance arrangements, 
accompanied by erratic internal communications. Two particular characteristics constituted 
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excellent staff engagement, as evidenced by feedback from managers and staff: a 
comprehensive staff health and wellbeing strategy, and opportunities for listening and 
training events which successfully included the whole workforce. Evidence from the ward 
and department managers survey conducted at three of our case study sites suggests that a 
comprehensive people strategy remained somewhat of an aspiration. In particular, middle-
managers’ perceptions of the opportunities for training and development, and encouragement 
to innovate in their trust, were very varied.
It was observed that part of the job of the board is “to filter all the nonsense that comes 
from outside” [Director of Organisational Development]. This interviewee, and others, felt 
that the board was effective in conveying to staff the importance of carrying on with caring 
for patients, and putting to one side some of the policy ambiguity that might be reigning in 
the wider NHS. This ‘shock absorber’ role of the board is developed further in our discussion 
section below. At the same time, there was evidence in a couple of the trusts with more stable 
board membership, that as well as a steady internal focus on quality, attention was paid to 
developing productive relationships with commissioners (local purchasers), and other local 
healthcare providers. For one of the trusts, which had recently come out of a regime of 
special measures imposed by the regulators, the board role was described as getting the basics 
right, a good line of sight from board to ward, and then beginning to focus on organisational 
strategy. 
We observed in the case studies, that in order to gain assurance and promulgate core 
values around patient-centred care and the importance of staff engagement, the boards carried 
out a lot of direct communication with employees and what the Chair of the board in one 
hospital called “dawn raids” to find out what has not been fixed. These efforts were generally 
appreciated: “Some but not all of the Board are very adept at reflecting and modelling the 
values of the Trust in their leadership style and behaviours” [First-line manager]; “Highly 
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committed, very supportive and focused in quality improvement, responding to risks and 
development of services” [Hospital consultant].
The longer-serving and more stable boards in our case studies exhibited greater unity and 
collective effort in terms of their behaviours. This was described by board members as being 
on the same side, and building close relationships with the senior clinical leadership of the 
trust, as well as being challenging, in an interrogative rather than in a confrontational way. 
This was the subject of probing during a regulator’s visit:  “Maybe I’m over sensitive: there 
was a slightly veiled positioning about ‘you’re daft to trust people, we shouldn't use trust as a 
currency’, whereas I always thought exactly the opposite” [Medical Director].
We found in the case studies that challenge by NEDs was expected, especially from the 
more recent appointments, and generally welcomed by executive directors. A view was 
expressed that they could be even more testing. Chairs were keen to coach NEDs to be 
appropriately challenging and in one example played devil’s advocate to provoke the 
expression of alternative perspectives. 
One of the public board meetings observed was very stage managed, with no questions 
from the public and little cross-questioning, but it was directly followed by a governors’ 
meeting in which executives fielded a wide range of questions. A board meeting at another 
trust was quite low energy and formal with little challenge from NEDs, and the meeting at a 
third also demonstrated fairly low challenge from NEDs. The discussions at the board 
meetings of the other three organisations were more spontaneous and spirited but challenge 
was nearly always congenial and supportive.
We observed strong nurse leadership in four out of six cases, both internally and, to some 
degree, externally focused. It was suggested that the re-ordering of priorities (and board 
agenda items) since Francis, with a greater emphasis now on quality of care, had provided the 
opportunity for the chief nurse to take up a more visible and prominent role as a trust leader. 
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As the chief nurse at one hospital put it, her role is “pricking the conscience of the board 
continuously”. We also observed variable contribution of executive directors beyond their 
functional role (for example finance directors commenting on issues arising from the patient 
story). These contributions had a marked impact and other board members listened carefully. 
Otherwise, contribution at board meetings by executive directors was generally dependent on 
the board agenda item. Actively supportive relationships between medical directors and chief 
nurses was noted – when examples of this occurred, it enhanced messages to the board about 
quality and safety. The chair and CEO in all case study sites set a tone that was calm, 
inclusive and thoughtful. In most cases the chair was also careful to draw in contributions 
from all board members and encourage executive director challenge as well as asking 
questions of their own. In one case the chair tended to summarise the agenda topic rather than 
to invite contributions.
Using the national survey data, we conducted exploratory bivariate and multivariate 
regression analyses to get a sense of relationships between board practice and impact 
variables. We focused only on highly statistically significant relationships which are robust to 
the exclusion of outliers and high leverage datapoints. There were significant correlations 
(p<0.01) between the amount of leadership development the board had participated in and the 
perceived impact of the board in relation to improving patient experience, staff engagement 
and patient voice.
As described earlier the regulator (the CQC) inspects and rates hospital trusts. The ratings 
are at one of four levels: Outstanding, Good, Requires Improvement, or Inadequate. By 
splitting our national survey responses by the rating of each respondent’s trust (combining the 
top two rating levels since there are very few Outstanding trusts) we see (Figure 2) that 
higher ratings are associated with a stronger self-reported emphasis on all the board purposes 
of our framework (Table 1), with the biggest difference on holding executives to account. 
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This indicates the difference that board discretionary effort and conscientiousness may make, 
and the importance of a rounded repertoire of board roles, which is developed further in the 
discussion section below.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Enablers and barriers 
The Francis Report was found, in itself, to be in general an enabler of cultural change in 
hospital trusts. As one NED put it in our national survey: “The Francis Report has acted as a 
reminder of what sort of an organisation we don't want to be like, and continues to be a 
reminder.” The other main enablers were seen to be organisations which had visible senior 
leaders, who consistently modelled behaviours that were congruent with their values, and had 
good governance, communications and administrative processes. A final enabler of improved 
leadership was the extent to which boards themselves believed that they were able to make an 
impact, rather than being policy victims. Those boards which exhibited a stronger internal 
locus of control32 as measured in our national survey by self-reported scores on impacts, also 
maintained a focus on strategy and had a stronger quality outcomes propensity. 
In the national survey the greatest challenge the board members reported was patient 
safety; the most often cited barrier to improving board leadership itself was financial 
pressures, which presented “a different kind of worry” [national opinion leader] for boards. 
As well as financial problems worsening, workforce shortages and the pressures of high 
patient demand also increased during the course of our study. In a tough financial 
environment with high levels of demand on services, the ‘iron triangle’ trade-offs33 of 
quality, cost and access dominated. As one NED put it: “There are no weekends or Christmas 
breaks in our world and the pressure to perform miracles with less funding is unabated.”
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There were also comments about the sometimes overbearing behaviours of regulators. 
This was described by a stakeholder interviewee as “when grip becomes throttle.” Some of 
the opinion leaders, respondents to the survey of board members, and participants in our case 
studies expressed frustration about the inconsistency of some national guidance. They also 
commented that behaviours exhibited by senior leaders in national planning and regulatory 
bodies were often incongruent with values promulgated in their own guidance documents. 
The effects of these behaviours, in the views of some stakeholders, was that a focus on 
providing evidence of compliance consumes time and energy that should be devoted to 
service improvement endeavours, which, in a vicious circle, limits the possibility of gaining 
assurance on quality of patient care in the longer term. Developing the role of the board as a 
shock absorber to mitigate some of this external pressure is considered below along with 
other roles for hospital boards.  
DISCUSSION  
There were three types of behaviours that the opinion leader interviewees, from their 
national vantage point, had observed and were concerned about, which they summed up as 
the ‘top down’, ‘powerless’ and ‘cosy’ types of boards. Facing some common challenges 
(finances, meeting performance targets, patient safety) and some very different ones (legacy 
of failures of care, geographical isolation, longstanding strong clinical and financial 
performance) it was striking how the board leadership of our six case study sites also 
exhibited very different corporate personalities. Summing them up each individually, in one 
word, in alphabetical order, they were: ‘classy’, ‘courageous’, ‘defiant’, ‘ramshackle’, 
‘recovering’ and ‘shiny’, with the caveat that these are to give an impression of certain 
characteristics of the trusts, and to illustrate diversity, rather than to pass judgement. The 
Page 18 of 63Health Services Management Research
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Proof
19
‘classy’ trust has pride, self-confidence, a fantastic brand, a non-executive cadre with their 
own distinguished careers, and is extremely focused on clinical excellence and improving 
staff engagement and loyalty. The ‘courageous’ trust has had opprobrium piled upon it by the 
media and was seen as professionally isolated, but is now regarded as an exemplar in several 
areas of patient and staff engagement and has built a reputation for living by its values. The 
‘defiant’ trust is a local district general hospital that used to consider itself successful, was 
shocked by external regulatory intervention, has a strong family feel and is somewhat 
defensive about external criticism. The ‘ramshackle’ trust demonstrates strong commitment 
to values of staff engagement and improving patient experience but consistent attention to 
execution and to follow-through was found lacking. The ‘recovering’ trust was picking itself 
up after a long period of churn on the board, poor staff morale and buffeting by regulators 
and the media. The ‘shiny’ trust has superb administrative systems and processes, and an 
excellent reputation for its staff engagement strategy and for patient-centred care. This 
provides a granular picture of how some hospital boards in England are wrestling, more or 
less successfully, with trying to deliver cultural change to provide well-organised and 
compassionate care for patients. 
Roles of hospital boards
Our analysis of the leadership changes made by NHS hospital trust boards since 2013 
leads us to highlight five key roles for healthcare boards. These roles are based on the main 
board mechanisms that were identified in the context-mechanism-outcome realist framework 
for healthcare boards (Table 1) and elaborated by identifying the behaviours, reasoning and 
responses of participants in our study, as suggested by Dalkin et al.,15 in an extended 
understanding of the mechanisms in our framework. We consider these five roles in turn:
- The board as conscience
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- The board as shock absorber
- The board as diplomat
- The board as sensor 
- The board as coach  
First, in relation to the role of the board as conscience of the organisation, the findings of 
this research underline the need for NHS boards to own the legacy of Francis in respect of 
upholding fundamental standards of care, and the principles of the NHS Constitution34 even 
when the external context makes it difficult to do so. This adds up to an explicit elaboration 
of the social performance purpose of the public board referred to earlier. This role of being 
the conscience of the organisation includes leading the development of a core set of values, 
deliberative and inclusive approaches to making priority-setting decisions, and using listening 
and questioning behaviours.
Second, with regard to the role of the board as shock absorber, a theme running through 
this study is the burden of external regulation experienced by some board members. In an 
often frenetic policy environment where new initiatives can appear to shower down on 
hospitals, boards need to act as a shock absorber for their organisation. This means absorbing 
the attention and challenge of multiple external bodies, probing where necessary, distilling 
the feedback into messages that can be used to guide and support changes, and sheltering 
staff from unhelpful external ‘noise’. This can include appropriately courageous behaviours 
when communicating with external national bodies.
Third, we identify the role of the board as diplomat, having the curiosity to understand the 
full range of internal and external stakeholder interests and perspectives, and knowing how to 
relate to other providers and operate within the local health and care economy. As a board 
secretary described it in the national survey: 
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Although the relationships with others in the local economy could not be said to be ‘poor’, 
they are not necessarily helpful. What is lacking is system leadership to try to overcome 
individual agendas and encourage collective thinking and action for the benefit of 
patients.
This also includes promoting the reputation of the organisation using ambassadorial type 
behaviours.
Fourth is the role of the board as sensor, and, as Dixon-Woods et al. have observed,31 with 
more of a problem-sensing than a comfort-seeking orientation when scrutinising, with skill 
and wisdom, an appropriate range of performance information. One of the lines of inquiry 
pursued in this research was that of healthcare boards needing to assume a stronger 
stakeholder role, engaging with others, restlessly, to find out about problems, determine 
solutions and seek constantly to improve care. In working with managers and staff in the 
pursuit of better and safer care, this can include exhibiting both challenging and supportive 
behaviours.
Fifth, in the turbulent times observed during our study and with the imperative for service 
improvement and striving for excellence to ensure sustainable and clinically effective care, it 
was clear that boards also had a valuable role as coach. This involves setting ambition and 
direction, assessing performance, and supporting staff, in an inquiring and collaborative way. 
We found that this role is best likely to be fulfilled when there is visibility, stability and 
continuity in board membership, and board members are trained and developed to deploy a 
wide repertoire of behaviours.
Repertoire of board behaviours
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We further propose that the five roles for healthcare boards described above are associated 
with certain modes of behaviour, building on the work of Cornforth7 who assigned particular 
kinds of behaviours to different board theories. We also referred in the introduction to other 
work that highlighted dyadic board behaviours23, 24 where a range of issues need to be 
handled or resolved by a board, and in so doing require multiple skills which are constantly 
held in tension in order to enable the work of the board to be achieved in an appropriately 
sensitive and reflexive manner.
So in the context of a low appetite for risk, and with the board in its role of sensor seeking 
out truths about performance, and using an agency theoretical frame, the likely dominant 
mode of behaviour is likely to be challenging, but also supportive (particularly in view of the 
unitary board model, and to ensure management is not driven to hide unpleasant facts about 
performance). In circumstances which particularly call for a coaching role to encourage 
collective innovation, improvement and striving for excellence, the likely dominant 
behaviours will be collaborative and inquiring, drawing from a stewardship theoretical 
perspective. When the external environment suggests the need for building the social capital 
of the organisation, which relates to a resource dependency theoretical view and the board 
enacting its role as diplomat, behaviours which demonstrate curiosity and ambassadorship are 
called for. A focus on high levels of staff engagement and long-term organisational 
sustainability indicates the importance of representation, collective effort and sharing of risks,  
the board as the conscience of the organisation, with listening and questioning behaviours 
coming to the fore to reflect the stakeholder perspective. Finally, the board acting as shock 
absorber to ensure an external equilibrium of power interests will need to be both probing and 
courageous. These roles for healthcare boards and associated behaviours are presented in a 
proposed extended theoretical framework for effective healthcare boards in Table 2.
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Our revised governance framework and our proposed repertoire of board behaviours 
reflect the notion that the lived experiences of board members do not fit neatly into traditional 
theoretical governance divisions. Switching from one type of leadership behaviour to another 
according circumstances may be important, but so too is the ability to deploy, across time, all 
the roles of the diligent board, suggested by our findings about the associations between 
regulatory ratings and board self-reported emphasis on different purposes (Figure 3). This is 
akin to Roberts et al.’s creation of skilful accountability10 and relates also to Garratt’s natural 
rhythm of the board’s year and the four tasks across the twelve months (policy formulation, 
strategic thinking, supervising management and ensuring accountability).35 This study 
therefore suggests that the deployment of not one, but a cluster of board practices, related to 
the full range of the main corporate governance theories, may be positively linked with 
organisation performance. Holding to account (agency theory) and support for managers 
(stewardship theory) are both important. So too is the fulfilment of other purposes of the 
board. The findings from the national survey suggest that the diligent board goes beyond the 
high-trust, high-challenge, high-engagement proposition to a fuller board repertoire including 
emphases on enhancing the reputation of the organisation  (resource dependency theory), 
representing the interests of stakeholders (stakeholder theory) and reconciling competing 
interests (power theory). The boards of organisations with higher regulatory ratings had 
statistically significant higher emphasis scores on all these purposes, as reported by board 
members. This indicates the impacts of the minimalist and maximalist board practices alluded 
to by Pettigrew and McNulty19, Storey21 and others. The highest scores in this study were for 
holding to account, suggesting that there are dangers in taking the foot off the pedal on this 
purpose, and the importance of the ‘restless’ board. Through depicting board activities as a 
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wheel that turns, Figure 3 demonstrates the interconnectedness of roles, behaviours and 
outcomes of the restless and dynamic healthcare board.
We would argue that although this research is based on hospital trusts in England, the 
findings are also largely relevant for other health care organisations as the interpretation of 
empirical findings draw upon on generic corporate governance theoretical propositions.  
Further, although governance models and political environments in other countries may vary, 
the quest for high quality and safe patient care and the impact of board failings, has an 
international resonance.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
CONCLUSIONS  
This paper aims to further ourour  understanding about an appropriate range of roles for 
boards in the context of healthcare, and associated behaviours connected with these roles. 
Our mixed-methods study examined how board leadership in NHS hospitals in England has 
changed in the aftermath of the Francis Inquiry into the failure of care at Stafford hospital, 
and has illuminated the complexity of relationships between contexts, focus, behaviours and 
outcomes. Our contribution is threefold. First, we offer a typology of board roles specifically 
for the challenging strategic and operational healthcare environment, and the need, first and 
foremost to focus on the provision of safe, compassionate and effective care. Second, we 
provide insight into the circumstances in which the enactment of roles and a repertoire of 
board behaviours may be conducive to certain outcomes, mindful of the call for theoretical 
pluralism in opening the ‘black box’ of boards. Third, we adduce further evidence for the 
difference that the diligent and, dynamic and restless board can make. This builds on the 
work of board governance scholars from Mace18 onwards who have exposed the gap between 
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the myths and the realities of the work of boards, and the impact of minimalist and 
maximalist board practices.
There are a number of limitations in the empirical study on which this paper is based. 
These include a response rate from the national survey of board members of only 20%. This 
is mitigated by achieving 90% coverage of all acute and specialist hospitals in England, but it 
still means that we have to be cautious about drawing conclusions from the results. Second, 
there is not yet sufficient evidence to suggest that the sets of behaviours that we have 
described as being connected with certain board roles are complete or necessarily exclusive 
to those roles.
We would, nevertheless, consider that these insights constitute a work in progress towards 
a theoretical framework for healthcare boards. The utility of the classification of board roles 
of conscience, shock absorber, sensor, diplomat and coach requires further investigation. The 
sets of dyadic behaviours that we have proposed as being associated with these roles need 
further testing. Finally, an area of future research would be to investigate the impact of the 
composition of the board, including backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives of board 
members on how roles are taken up and behaviours are enacted. 
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INTRODUCTION
The public sector board has social performance and the creation of public value as its two 
central purposes.1 Created for public boards, Carver’s policy governance model enables 
boards to govern by making values explicit, and by having a board member focus, in line 
with agency theory, entirely on ends, not on means; the latter being, in Carver’s view, the job 
of management. The intended effect is more authoritative boards, as well as more empowered 
management.2 The events at Stafford hospital in England are arguably an unintended effect of 
this position: the board there was deemed to be distant from, and largely unaware of, the daily 
realities in the hospital, with attention primarily on financial strategy.3, 4 
The normative position, in many jurisdictions, including in the NHS in England, since the 
advent of New Public Management (NPM) principles, is that public sector boards now 
largely follow the example set by the commercial sector.5 There has been some concern 
expressed that there can be transferability problems and issues of institutional isomorphism,6 
in this case when governance structures and processes are copied without regard to their 
relevance to the public sector context. 
The corporate board is used in many healthcare systems as the model of governance for 
public hospitals,1 on the basis of its combination of executive and non-executive, internal and 
independent, professional and lay contributions, and the requirement for diverse perspectives 
and skills to be brought together in order to reach collective decisions in the best interests of 
the organisation, its strategy, and operational accountability. In the NHS in England, 
particular attention has been paid to hospital boards following the report of the public inquiry 
into Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust in 2013 (the Francis Report)4 that concluded 
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that it was the board of the Trust that bore ultimate accountability for failings in quality and 
safety of care.
This paper draws on findings from empirical research undertaken in the NHS in England 
which sought to detect and understand changes in hospital board leadership made in the wake 
of the Francis Report. The motivation lies in the potential to secure generalisable insights into 
the ingredients of effective healthcare board roles and behaviours, drawing from existing 
theoretical public board governance frameworks, and empirical findings from this study.   We 
concentrate on two research questions within that study: first, what does theory and empirical 
evidence from this study tell us about an appropriate range of roles for healthcare boards ? 
Second, what are the associated behaviours connected with these roles? To address these 
questions, we examine the relevant literature on the role of boards within healthcare 
organisations, drawing on combined and complementary theoretical perspectives of board 
composition, roles and dynamics, with a particular focus on the interplay of these with the 
quality and safety of care provided by hospitals. We then go on to describe the study design 
and selected empirical findings related to the two questions outlined above. We structure our 
findings by, first, identifying variations in enactment of roles and behaviours, second, 
outlining the impacts and effects of board  practices, and third, surfacing enablers and barriers 
to improving leadership. We conclude by proposing a set of theoretically informed roles for 
diligent, dynamic and restless boards in the healthcare sector and a repertoire of board 
behaviours that are connected with these roles, to inform a refreshed theoretical framework 
for healthcare board leadership practice. We start by outlining the healthcare board 
governance context, with specific reference to the NHS.
BOARDS IN HEALTHCARE ORGANISATIONS AND IN THE NHS
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In the healthcare setting, there are multiple stakeholders including patients, staff, 
healthcare professions, regulators, funders and government. This constrains the power of the 
board both in relation to setting strategy, and in monitoring and improving performance, but 
does not absolve it from responsibility for assuring safe, high quality and effective patient 
care.
There are various structures in different countries in use for hospital boards, including 
non-executive trustee-style boards, unitary boards, two-tier boards and four-part governance 
arrangements. Under the influence of NPM (see for example Ferlie et al.5) these structures 
have generally changed to mirror more closely the private sector style board, and with 
stronger devolved accountability. 
In the case of England, since 1990 NHS hospital boards have been modelled on the private 
sector unitary board concept, with around eleven to fourteen members including a non-
executive chair, chief executive, executive directors and a majority of appointed 
(independent) non-executive directors (NEDs); all members of the board have collective 
responsibility for hospital performance. 
Following the extensively documented failings of care at the Mid-Staffordshire Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust, Robert Francis QC identified five main areas on which all NHS 
organisations needed to focus, led by their boards, namely: ensuring fundamental quality 
standards; enabling a culture of openness, transparency and candour; having a comprehensive 
set of nursing standards; patient-centred leadership; and making good use of timely 
information to assess performance.4 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
It has been argued that behaviours can be related to the sometimes unconscious alignment of 
individual members to the different theories about corporate governance.7 These theories 
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have been well-rehearsed elsewhere.8-13 Agency theory, which is based on the belief that 
shareholders’ or stakeholders’ interests are likely to be at variance with managers’ interests, 
is associated with a challenging and defending set of behaviours in the boardroom. 
Stewardship theory, on the other hand, with its notion of a shared and common agenda, puts a 
premium on a high trust and collaborative style of working. In resource dependency theory, 
the main job of the board is to maximise the benefits of external dependencies which favours 
outward looking and ambassadorial type behaviours. From a stakeholder theory perspective, 
the importance of the representation of different communities of interest is prioritised, with a 
resulting consensus-building behavioural orientation. Finally, in relation to the sources and 
use of board power, managerial hegemony posits that in practice the managers, sometimes in 
combination with or responding to external agencies, make most of the decisions, with the 
rest of the board relegated to a rubber stamping role.
Recent thinking suggests that rather than one or other of the theories being, in general, 
superior or preferred, context and desired outcomes should guide which theory (or 
combination) and related mechanisms best fit the circumstances. As Erwin et al. suggest,14 
depending on the hospital or health system’s mission or strategic goals, certain types of 
boards or board processes might be preferred and researchers should continue to study boards 
with this perspective in mind. For this study we therefore draw on a realist-informed 
interpretation framework for healthcare boards as outlined in Table 1. This outlines the five 
different combinations for boards in relation to theories listed in the paragraph above, their 
contextual assumptions, the mechanisms used by boards and their intended outcomes. The 
framework posits that an underlying belief in the primary board purpose and the prevailing 
context is likely to drive the choice of mechanisms to achieve the board’s objectives and 
intended organisation outcomes. Realists suggest that exposing not only the mechanisms of 
change in an intervention, but more importantly their relationship to the context of 
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implementation is key to the evaluation of complex programmes.15 We use this approach as 
the starting point for our search for a hospital board behaviour repertoire. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In line with the theoretical pluralism advocated by Roberts, McNulty and Stiles,10 this 
position proposes that having an orientation towards a particular board purpose brings with it 
the likelihood of a varying set of priorities, which then relate to different organisational 
performance outcomes,1 as indicated in Table 1. The gap in the literature, as exemplified by 
this framework, is that as it stands, there is no explicit consideration of board practices that 
have an influence, as mechanisms, on these different purposes and desired outcomes. 
Veronesi and Keasey, for example, found that the dominance of the healthcare ‘expert’ board 
(that is composed largely of healthcare professionals and insiders) led to behaviours that 
often precluded post-NPM behavioural norms of flexibility, responsiveness, listening and 
collaboration with wider stakeholders.16 Lee et al. confirm previous findings that many 
hospital boards are not fulfilling their expected roles as described in the literature.17 In an 
extensive US-focused review of hospital board governance research since 1990, Erwin et al. 
found that the occupational background of board members influenced choice of focus, 
behavioural dynamics and the need for training to fulfil quality of care monitoring.14 
The work and functioning of boards is thus empirically variable, not only as conditioned 
by composition and external forces, but also by board processes and the deployment of the 
will and skill of individual board members, minimalist and maximalist board practices, and 
locked-in routines.18-21 This line of research from the authors listed above emphasises board 
effort as discretionary, with board members having a choice to work more or less hard in the 
enactment of their role. 
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Lynall and colleagues argue that board activities are subject to path dependency and a 
reflection of the relative power and influence of the CEO and external parties at the time of 
formation.22 Other work has focused on board behaviours13, 23 and in particular ‘dyadic 
behaviours’,23-25 where apparently paradoxical issues need to be resolved by a board, and in 
so doing require multiple skills to enable the work of the board to be achieved in an 
appropriately sensitive and reflexive manner. Recent work has developed the concept of the 
‘triadic’ board, where board leadership combines robust challenge of and strong support for 
the executive with significant engagement on the part of the board with internal and external 
stakeholders.1
Roberts et al. emphasised that board accountability is actualised by a whole range of 
behaviours that are only visible at close range.10 Van Puyvelde et al., for example, found that 
boards of nursing homes experienced a simultaneous need to both control and collaborate 
with their managers.25 They argue there is a governance tension in combining these two 
different roles as it requires boards to behave in very different ways: the controlling role is 
more reactive and includes careful monitoring and scrutiny, and collaborating is more 
proactive and requires visioning and a broader understanding of the organisation and its 
environment. The gap in the literature is thus an  understanding of the effects of minimalist 
and maximalist board practices or discretionary board effort (as described by Pettigrew and 
McNulty,19 and how dyadic cycles of supportive and controlling, trusting and challenging 
board behaviours can be self-correcting and lead to better organisation performance.23 The 
focus of this paper is how such greater understanding could enhance the theoretical 
framework for effective unitary healthcare boards (Figure 1) that is our starting point. 
We now report on a mixed-methods study that sought to open up the ‘black box’ of board 
practices within the healthcare sector in the NHS in England.26 We ask, first, what does 
theory, and empirical evidence from this study, tell us about an appropriate range of roles for 
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boards in the context of the NHS, and, second, what are the associated behaviours connected 
with these roles. Along the way we investigated how board practices reflected the different 
theories (Table 1), to better understand dyadic combinations of behaviours, and possible 
barriers to productive combination. Our aim was to understand better the differential impact 
of discretionary board effort, or minimalist and maximalist board practices19 and how cycles 
of supportive and controlling, and trusting and challenging board behaviours can be self-
correcting and lead to better organisation performance,23 and how this could enhance the 
proposed theoretical framework for effective unitary healthcare boards. To achieve this, the 
research examined the behaviours of hospital boards in relation to effective organisational 
leadership and shaping organisational culture, and identified ways that enable boards to 
prioritise patient safety (reducing the risk of harm), improving the experience of care (the 
collaborative effort between patient and clinician) and enhancing the clinical effectiveness of 
care (the capability for service improvement). All of which were key themes in the Francis 
Report.4
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS
For the purposes of this paper, which is to advance our theoretical understanding 
specifically about healthcare board roles and behaviours we report in particular on the 
findings in relation to these matters. 
Given the intrinsic complexity of the contribution of board roles and behaviours to 
effective healthcare governance, the research adopted a multi-method approach, with four 
different phases, and integrating qualitative and quantitative elements to examine these 
relationships in both breadth and depth (see Figure 1). The different sources of data also 
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enabled triangulation to take place to strengthen the development of theoretical propositions 
about healthcare board roles and behaviours.
To ensure that the study was grounded in the most recent theoretical and empirical 
governance scholarship and was cognisant of current policy developments, we carried out an 
initial scoping study (Phase 1) which included thirteen stakeholder interviews with national-
level stakeholders and opinion leaders. To capture the breadth of associations between recent 
board actions and care quality, we conducted a national survey identifying the range of 
measures taken by hospitals in response to recommendations in the Francis Report and 
subsequent national guidance (Phase 2). This survey, with 381 responses, gathered mainly 
quantifiable data to map connections between perceived board purposes and impacts, 
including barriers to action and contextual influences. To contribute depth, we used 
comparative case study methods and qualitative approaches to explore the detailed 
implementation and effects of recent actions of boards in six hospital trusts (Phase 3). This 
included a survey of ward and department managers in three of the case study trusts. The 
final phase was to analyse separately and then synthesise the findings from the three earlier 
phases to produce a set of practical, evidence-based and theoretically-informed learning 
points for boards.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Scoping work involved 13 interviews (four by phone and nine face to face) with key 
individuals from national organisations representing patients, medical and nursing 
professions, healthcare regulators, policy think tanks and Department of Health 
representatives. eliciting views on current concerns for boards, actions expected to have been 
taken as a result of the Francis Inquiry, the perceived and actual role of boards in overseeing 
and improving care quality and safety, the desirable characteristics of healthcare boards and 
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the barriers to improving board-level leadership in the NHS. The interviews were either 
recorded or extensive notes taken and thematically analysed.
The purpose of the survey was to gather mainly quantifiable data about boards and how 
members see the board impacting on the organisation, including changes since the 
publication of the Francis Report in February 2013. We surveyed CEOs, chairs, chief nurses, 
directors of finance, medical directors, non-executive directors, and board secretaries 
between December 2015 and May 2016. We asked questions about: 
1. Specific actions to improve board and organisational leadership (e.g. new policies, 
processes) 
2. Perceived impacts on intermediate outcomes (e.g. organisational strategies, structures, 
culture) and on organisational performance  
3. Perceptions of the connections between actions and impacts, including underlying 
mechanisms, barriers faced and contextual influences. 
A mix of tick box and free text responses were sought in order to facilitate both 
comparative statistical analyses and an understanding of underlying issues and the influence 
of contextual factors. We were aware of needing to keep the questionnaire short because 
board members have many demands on their time and because of evidence of association 
between length of survey questionnaires and diminishing response rates.27
381 respondents completed the survey (20% response rate). At least one response was 
received from 139 (90%) of the 154 NHS hospital trusts and foundation trusts in England at 
that time.
We purposively selected six case studies using criteria for maximising the range that were 
agreed at the stakeholder workshop convened to refine our research approach. These included 
geographical variation, a mix of larger teaching hospital and smaller district hospital trusts, 
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single and multi-site, greater or lesser stability of board membership, higher and lower 
performing organisations (as determined by the Care Quality Commission and Trust 
Development Authority assessments), foundation and non-foundation trusts and at least one 
specialist acute trust. We used a comparative case-study design to generalise theoretically 
from within and between cases.28 While each case has its own integrity in terms of theory 
building and generating policy implications, we developed common themes across sites using 
comparative case study methods and pattern matching.29, 30
Data collection methods for case study work included semi-structured interviews with 
executive and non-executive board members of trusts, commissioners, staff representatives, 
patient groups and the trust board secretary. A minimum of 12 interviews took place in each 
case study site, supplemented by two governors, patient and staff focus group discussions or a 
series of individual in-depth interviews per site. We also observed one public board meeting 
and one meeting of governors in each site and a number of board committees, using these to 
inform our understanding of local board and organisational dynamics. We undertook 
documentary analysis of board papers, trust annual plans and reports (including about staff 
engagement and development, and patient and public involvement), materials related to board 
development activities, data on board and organisational development and quality accounts. 
In interviews and focus group discussions, we explored knowledge and views of board 
initiatives taken in response to the Francis Inquiry. These included assessments of the 
relevance, usefulness, and impact of such actions, costs in terms of staff and others’ time, 
barriers encountered and thoughts about how best to improve further the governance and 
leadership of the board and trust. In addition, we were able to administer an online survey 
questionnaire to middle managers (ward and department managers) at three out of the six 
case study sites. Two of the others declined to participate, and in the remaining trust the 
response rate was too low for completed questionnaires to be considered for analysis. The 
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survey was based on items in our national board-level survey. A particular aim was to elicit 
qualitative responses from a wider population to supplement the interviews and focus groups. 
Therefore we included many free-text-response items.
All interviews and focus group discussions or notes were fully transcribed and we used 
qualitative coding software (Dedoose) to facilitate data storage and retrieval in analysis. All 
members of the research team were involved in generating coding frames for themes from 
qualitative data, and we carried out an exercise to compare independent coding of a subset of 
data to identify and address coding differences and ensure consistency. As part of our testing 
of emerging themes and for checking external validity we offered to present our findings at a 
board meeting.  Three case study sites responded to our invitation to feed back, thus helping 
us refine our final report.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
We now report selected findings from the study, highlighting those results that relate to the 
focus of this paper We draw on identified variations in enactment of roles and behaviours, the 
impacts and effects of board practices, and enablers and barriers to improving leadership, in 
order to propose an enhancement to current theoretical understandings of roles and 
behaviours for effective healthcare board governance.
Variations in enactment of roles and behaviours 
The first phase comprised interviews with key national-level stakeholders and opinion 
leaders. In terms of focus, there were four main areas of board working that were considered 
by opinion leaders to be crucial. First was a palpable concentration of effort towards ensuring 
patient-centred care. Second was the need to support staff, heed concerns and provide 
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protection from negative pressures. A close alignment between what the board says and what 
staff say about what is going on in the organisation was a good indicator of a positive 
organisation culture. Third was the importance of enabling a climate for compassionate care, 
insisting on certain behaviours and ensuring good governance. Running through all these was 
the priority that should be accorded to quality, safety and learning for improvement, and, as 
one informant quoted from Dixon-Woods et al. “more problem-sensing than comfort-
seeking” (p.114),31 ensuring that the quest for assurance is balanced with a drive for 
improvement. Underpinning this effort, our informants told us that the board should be 
receiving detailed and timely data on patient and staff concerns, ensuring that quality 
improvement is hardwired through organisation, and using good quality data and information 
as the basis for improvement.
Reflecting the expectations of our opinion leader informants, the findings from the 
national survey (Phase 2) demonstrated the strength of ambition of NHS board members to 
make cultural changes in the wake of the Francis Report. This ambition was mirrored in our 
six case study sites (Phase 3). There was, however, variation in the extent to which these 
ambitions were realised. We relate the effects of this variable achievement of board aims to 
our conceptualisation of board leadership characteristics, practices and behaviours in the 
discussion section.
What contextual influences accounted for some of these differences? Variations in the 
perceived quality of middle management, teamworking, the embeddedness of quality 
improvement, the stability of board membership, and the self-perceived strategic competence 
of the board were connected in three of the case study organisations which were on an 
improving trajectory, in regulatory terms. In two of these cases there were also reported 
concerns about the robustness of governance systems and processes. This indicates the 
sustained hard work, over an extended period of time, that is involved in the leadership effort 
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to take organisations out of trouble. The discussion section below offers further insights into 
the effects of these and other, different, board leadership characteristics and behaviours.
Impacts of board leadership practices and behaviours
In the national survey and case studies many respondents mentioned the influence of the 
Francis Report in changing the focus of their board’s attention:
It became ‘OK’ to talk about the patients and their care much more, the old adage of 
strategy as being the ‘in’ thing was actually eaten by the understanding that the right 
culture is what is really important. Looking after your patients but equally looking 
after your staff, communication, engagement, empowerment were all important 
previously, however post Francis this was ‘accepted’ as what we must do and it was 
not optional. [Chief Nurse]
There were limits to board adherence to the ethos of patient-centredness of care, however. 
Though the average scores are high for knowledge about patients and their families, and 
about staff, respondents felt they had the most knowledge about what was important to 
regulators (Wilcoxon signed rank test p<0.01). The proposed board role of being the 
conscience of the organisation which we outline in more detail below draws on this finding.
In relation to knowing what mattered to hospital staff, we found much effort had been 
invested in improving staff engagement. Sometimes the starting point was low, as one 
medical director remarked, when s/he first came into post “Nobody told them they were good 
at anything”. The reported impact of these efforts varied across our case study sites. One of 
the inhibiting factors was the empowerment of the middle-management cadre. In some of our 
case study sites, the onus lay too heavily on the executive tier. A further issue commented on 
by some staff was a lack of discipline and consistency in internal governance arrangements, 
accompanied by erratic internal communications. Two particular characteristics constituted 
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excellent staff engagement, as evidenced by feedback from managers and staff: a 
comprehensive staff health and wellbeing strategy, and opportunities for listening and 
training events which successfully included the whole workforce. Evidence from the ward 
and department managers survey conducted at three of our case study sites suggests that a 
comprehensive people strategy remained somewhat of an aspiration. In particular, middle-
managers’ perceptions of the opportunities for training and development, and encouragement 
to innovate in their trust, were very varied.
It was observed that part of the job of the board is “to filter all the nonsense that comes 
from outside” [Director of Organisational Development]. This interviewee, and others, felt 
that the board was effective in conveying to staff the importance of carrying on with caring 
for patients, and putting to one side some of the policy ambiguity that might be reigning in 
the wider NHS. This ‘shock absorber’ role of the board is developed further in our discussion 
section below. At the same time, there was evidence in a couple of the trusts with more stable 
board membership, that as well as a steady internal focus on quality, attention was paid to 
developing productive relationships with commissioners (local purchasers), and other local 
healthcare providers. For one of the trusts, which had recently come out of a regime of 
special measures imposed by the regulators, the board role was described as getting the basics 
right, a good line of sight from board to ward, and then beginning to focus on organisational 
strategy. 
We observed in the case studies, that in order to gain assurance and promulgate core 
values around patient-centred care and the importance of staff engagement, the boards carried 
out a lot of direct communication with employees and what the Chair of the board in one 
hospital called “dawn raids” to find out what has not been fixed. These efforts were generally 
appreciated: “Some but not all of the Board are very adept at reflecting and modelling the 
values of the Trust in their leadership style and behaviours” [First-line manager]; “Highly 
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committed, very supportive and focused in quality improvement, responding to risks and 
development of services” [Hospital consultant].
The longer-serving and more stable boards in our case studies exhibited greater unity and 
collective effort in terms of their behaviours. This was described by board members as being 
on the same side, and building close relationships with the senior clinical leadership of the 
trust, as well as being challenging, in an interrogative rather than in a confrontational way. 
This was the subject of probing during a regulator’s visit:  “Maybe I’m over sensitive: there 
was a slightly veiled positioning about ‘you’re daft to trust people, we shouldn't use trust as a 
currency’, whereas I always thought exactly the opposite” [Medical Director].
We found in the case studies that challenge by NEDs was expected, especially from the 
more recent appointments, and generally welcomed by executive directors. A view was 
expressed that they could be even more testing. Chairs were keen to coach NEDs to be 
appropriately challenging and in one example played devil’s advocate to provoke the 
expression of alternative perspectives. 
One of the public board meetings observed was very stage managed, with no questions 
from the public and little cross-questioning, but it was directly followed by a governors’ 
meeting in which executives fielded a wide range of questions. A board meeting at another 
trust was quite low energy and formal with little challenge from NEDs, and the meeting at a 
third also demonstrated fairly low challenge from NEDs. The discussions at the board 
meetings of the other three organisations were more spontaneous and spirited but challenge 
was nearly always congenial and supportive.
We observed strong nurse leadership in four out of six cases, both internally and, to some 
degree, externally focused. It was suggested that the re-ordering of priorities (and board 
agenda items) since Francis, with a greater emphasis now on quality of care, had provided the 
opportunity for the chief nurse to take up a more visible and prominent role as a trust leader. 
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As the chief nurse at one hospital put it, her role is “pricking the conscience of the board 
continuously”. We also observed variable contribution of executive directors beyond their 
functional role (for example finance directors commenting on issues arising from the patient 
story). These contributions had a marked impact and other board members listened carefully. 
Otherwise, contribution at board meetings by executive directors was generally dependent on 
the board agenda item. Actively supportive relationships between medical directors and chief 
nurses was noted – when examples of this occurred, it enhanced messages to the board about 
quality and safety. The chair and CEO in all case study sites set a tone that was calm, 
inclusive and thoughtful. In most cases the chair was also careful to draw in contributions 
from all board members and encourage executive director challenge as well as asking 
questions of their own. In one case the chair tended to summarise the agenda topic rather than 
to invite contributions.
Using the national survey data, we conducted exploratory bivariate and multivariate 
regression analyses to get a sense of relationships between board practice and impact 
variables. We focused only on highly statistically significant relationships which are robust to 
the exclusion of outliers and high leverage datapoints. There were significant correlations 
(p<0.01) between the amount of leadership development the board had participated in and the 
perceived impact of the board in relation to improving patient experience, staff engagement 
and patient voice.
As described earlier the regulator (the CQC) inspects and rates hospital trusts. The ratings 
are at one of four levels: Outstanding, Good, Requires Improvement, or Inadequate. By 
splitting our national survey responses by the rating of each respondent’s trust (combining the 
top two rating levels since there are very few Outstanding trusts) we see (Figure 2) that 
higher ratings are associated with a stronger self-reported emphasis on all the board purposes 
of our framework (Table 1), with the biggest difference on holding executives to account. 
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This indicates the difference that board discretionary effort and conscientiousness may make, 
and the importance of a rounded repertoire of board roles, which is developed further in the 
discussion section below.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Enablers and barriers 
The Francis Report was found, in itself, to be in general an enabler of cultural change in 
hospital trusts. As one NED put it in our national survey: “The Francis Report has acted as a 
reminder of what sort of an organisation we don't want to be like, and continues to be a 
reminder.” The other main enablers were seen to be organisations which had visible senior 
leaders, who consistently modelled behaviours that were congruent with their values, and had 
good governance, communications and administrative processes. A final enabler of improved 
leadership was the extent to which boards themselves believed that they were able to make an 
impact, rather than being policy victims. Those boards which exhibited a stronger internal 
locus of control32 as measured in our national survey by self-reported scores on impacts, also 
maintained a focus on strategy and had a stronger quality outcomes propensity. 
In the national survey the greatest challenge the board members reported was patient 
safety; the most often cited barrier to improving board leadership itself was financial 
pressures, which presented “a different kind of worry” [national opinion leader] for boards. 
As well as financial problems worsening, workforce shortages and the pressures of high 
patient demand also increased during the course of our study. In a tough financial 
environment with high levels of demand on services, the ‘iron triangle’ trade-offs33 of 
quality, cost and access dominated. As one NED put it: “There are no weekends or Christmas 
breaks in our world and the pressure to perform miracles with less funding is unabated.”
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There were also comments about the sometimes overbearing behaviours of regulators. 
This was described by a stakeholder interviewee as “when grip becomes throttle.” Some of 
the opinion leaders, respondents to the survey of board members, and participants in our case 
studies expressed frustration about the inconsistency of some national guidance. They also 
commented that behaviours exhibited by senior leaders in national planning and regulatory 
bodies were often incongruent with values promulgated in their own guidance documents. 
The effects of these behaviours, in the views of some stakeholders, was that a focus on 
providing evidence of compliance consumes time and energy that should be devoted to 
service improvement endeavours, which, in a vicious circle, limits the possibility of gaining 
assurance on quality of patient care in the longer term. Developing the role of the board as a 
shock absorber to mitigate some of this external pressure is considered below along with 
other roles for hospital boards.  
DISCUSSION  
There were three types of behaviours that the opinion leader interviewees, from their 
national vantage point, had observed and were concerned about, which they summed up as 
the ‘top down’, ‘powerless’ and ‘cosy’ types of boards. Facing some common challenges 
(finances, meeting performance targets, patient safety) and some very different ones (legacy 
of failures of care, geographical isolation, longstanding strong clinical and financial 
performance) it was striking how the board leadership of our six case study sites also 
exhibited very different corporate personalities. Summing them up each individually, in one 
word, in alphabetical order, they were: ‘classy’, ‘courageous’, ‘defiant’, ‘ramshackle’, 
‘recovering’ and ‘shiny’, with the caveat that these are to give an impression of certain 
characteristics of the trusts, and to illustrate diversity, rather than to pass judgement. The 
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‘classy’ trust has pride, self-confidence, a fantastic brand, a non-executive cadre with their 
own distinguished careers, and is extremely focused on clinical excellence and improving 
staff engagement and loyalty. The ‘courageous’ trust has had opprobrium piled upon it by the 
media and was seen as professionally isolated, but is now regarded as an exemplar in several 
areas of patient and staff engagement and has built a reputation for living by its values. The 
‘defiant’ trust is a local district general hospital that used to consider itself successful, was 
shocked by external regulatory intervention, has a strong family feel and is somewhat 
defensive about external criticism. The ‘ramshackle’ trust demonstrates strong commitment 
to values of staff engagement and improving patient experience but consistent attention to 
execution and to follow-through was found lacking. The ‘recovering’ trust was picking itself 
up after a long period of churn on the board, poor staff morale and buffeting by regulators 
and the media. The ‘shiny’ trust has superb administrative systems and processes, and an 
excellent reputation for its staff engagement strategy and for patient-centred care. This 
provides a granular picture of how some hospital boards in England are wrestling, more or 
less successfully, with trying to deliver cultural change to provide well-organised and 
compassionate care for patients. 
Roles of hospital boards
Our analysis of the leadership changes made by NHS hospital trust boards since 2013 
leads us to highlight five key roles for healthcare boards. These roles are based on the main 
board mechanisms that were identified in the context-mechanism-outcome realist framework 
for healthcare boards (Table 1) and elaborated by identifying the behaviours, reasoning and 
responses of participants in our study, as suggested by Dalkin et al.,15 in an extended 
understanding of the mechanisms in our framework. We consider these five roles in turn:
- The board as conscience
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- The board as shock absorber
- The board as diplomat
- The board as sensor 
- The board as coach  
First, in relation to the role of the board as conscience of the organisation, the findings of 
this research underline the need for NHS boards to own the legacy of Francis in respect of 
upholding fundamental standards of care, and the principles of the NHS Constitution34 even 
when the external context makes it difficult to do so. This adds up to an explicit elaboration 
of the social performance purpose of the public board referred to earlier. This role of being 
the conscience of the organisation includes leading the development of a core set of values, 
deliberative and inclusive approaches to making priority-setting decisions, and using listening 
and questioning behaviours.
Second, with regard to the role of the board as shock absorber, a theme running through 
this study is the burden of external regulation experienced by some board members. In an 
often frenetic policy environment where new initiatives can appear to shower down on 
hospitals, boards need to act as a shock absorber for their organisation. This means absorbing 
the attention and challenge of multiple external bodies, probing where necessary, distilling 
the feedback into messages that can be used to guide and support changes, and sheltering 
staff from unhelpful external ‘noise’. This can include appropriately courageous behaviours 
when communicating with external national bodies.
Third, we identify the role of the board as diplomat, having the curiosity to understand the 
full range of internal and external stakeholder interests and perspectives, and knowing how to 
relate to other providers and operate within the local health and care economy. As a board 
secretary described it in the national survey: 
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Although the relationships with others in the local economy could not be said to be ‘poor’, 
they are not necessarily helpful. What is lacking is system leadership to try to overcome 
individual agendas and encourage collective thinking and action for the benefit of 
patients.
This also includes promoting the reputation of the organisation using ambassadorial type 
behaviours.
Fourth is the role of the board as sensor, and, as Dixon-Woods et al. have observed,31 with 
more of a problem-sensing than a comfort-seeking orientation when scrutinising, with skill 
and wisdom, an appropriate range of performance information. One of the lines of inquiry 
pursued in this research was that of healthcare boards needing to assume a stronger 
stakeholder role, engaging with others, restlessly, to find out about problems, determine 
solutions and seek constantly to improve care. In working with managers and staff in the 
pursuit of better and safer care, this can include exhibiting both challenging and supportive 
behaviours.
Fifth, in the turbulent times observed during our study and with the imperative for service 
improvement and striving for excellence to ensure sustainable and clinically effective care, it 
was clear that boards also had a valuable role as coach. This involves setting ambition and 
direction, assessing performance, and supporting staff, in an inquiring and collaborative way. 
We found that this role is best likely to be fulfilled when there is visibility, stability and 
continuity in board membership, and board members are trained and developed to deploy a 
wide repertoire of behaviours.
Repertoire of board behaviours
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We further propose that the five roles for healthcare boards described above are associated 
with certain modes of behaviour, building on the work of Cornforth7 who assigned particular 
kinds of behaviours to different board theories. We also referred in the introduction to other 
work that highlighted dyadic board behaviours23, 24 where a range of issues need to be 
handled or resolved by a board, and in so doing require multiple skills which are constantly 
held in tension in order to enable the work of the board to be achieved in an appropriately 
sensitive and reflexive manner.
So in the context of a low appetite for risk, and with the board in its role of sensor seeking 
out truths about performance, and using an agency theoretical frame, the likely dominant 
mode of behaviour is likely to be challenging, but also supportive (particularly in view of the 
unitary board model, and to ensure management is not driven to hide unpleasant facts about 
performance). In circumstances which particularly call for a coaching role to encourage 
collective innovation, improvement and striving for excellence, the likely dominant 
behaviours will be collaborative and inquiring, drawing from a stewardship theoretical 
perspective. When the external environment suggests the need for building the social capital 
of the organisation, which relates to a resource dependency theoretical view and the board 
enacting its role as diplomat, behaviours which demonstrate curiosity and ambassadorship are 
called for. A focus on high levels of staff engagement and long-term organisational 
sustainability indicates the importance of representation, collective effort and sharing of risks,  
the board as the conscience of the organisation, with listening and questioning behaviours 
coming to the fore to reflect the stakeholder perspective. Finally, the board acting as shock 
absorber to ensure an external equilibrium of power interests will need to be both probing and 
courageous. These roles for healthcare boards and associated behaviours are presented in a 
proposed extended theoretical framework for effective healthcare boards in Table 2.
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Our revised governance framework and our proposed repertoire of board behaviours 
reflect the notion that the lived experiences of board members do not fit neatly into traditional 
theoretical governance divisions. Switching from one type of leadership behaviour to another 
according circumstances may be important, but so too is the ability to deploy, across time, all 
the roles of the diligent board, suggested by our findings about the associations between 
regulatory ratings and board self-reported emphasis on different purposes (Figure 3). This is 
akin to Roberts et al.’s creation of skilful accountability10 and relates also to Garratt’s natural 
rhythm of the board’s year and the four tasks across the twelve months (policy formulation, 
strategic thinking, supervising management and ensuring accountability).35 This study 
therefore suggests that the deployment of not one, but a cluster of board practices, related to 
the full range of the main corporate governance theories, may be positively linked with 
organisation performance. Holding to account (agency theory) and support for managers 
(stewardship theory) are both important. So too is the fulfilment of other purposes of the 
board. The findings from the national survey suggest that the diligent board goes beyond the 
high-trust, high-challenge, high-engagement proposition to a fuller board repertoire including 
emphases on enhancing the reputation of the organisation  (resource dependency theory), 
representing the interests of stakeholders (stakeholder theory) and reconciling competing 
interests (power theory). The boards of organisations with higher regulatory ratings had 
statistically significant higher emphasis scores on all these purposes, as reported by board 
members. This indicates the impacts of the minimalist and maximalist board practices alluded 
to by Pettigrew and McNulty19, Storey21 and others. The highest scores in this study were for 
holding to account, suggesting that there are dangers in taking the foot off the pedal on this 
purpose, and the importance of the ‘restless’ board. Through depicting board activities as a 
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wheel that turns, Figure 3 demonstrates the interconnectedness of roles, behaviours and 
outcomes of the restless and dynamic healthcare board.
We would argue that although this research is based on hospital trusts in England, the 
findings are also largely relevant for other health care organisations as the interpretation of 
empirical findings draw upon on generic corporate governance theoretical propositions.  
Further, although governance models and political environments in other countries may vary, 
the quest for high quality and safe patient care and the impact of board failings, has an 
international resonance.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
CONCLUSIONS  
This paper aims to further our understanding about an appropriate range of roles for boards in 
the context of healthcare, and associated behaviours connected with these roles. Our mixed-
methods study examined how board leadership in NHS hospitals in England has changed in 
the aftermath of the Francis Inquiry into the failure of care at Stafford hospital, and has 
illuminated the complexity of relationships between contexts, focus, behaviours and 
outcomes. Our contribution is threefold. First, we offer a typology of board roles specifically 
for the challenging strategic and operational healthcare environment, and the need, first and 
foremost to focus on the provision of safe, compassionate and effective care. Second, we 
provide insight into the circumstances in which the enactment of roles and a repertoire of 
board behaviours may be conducive to certain outcomes, mindful of the call for theoretical 
pluralism in opening the ‘black box’ of boards. Third, we adduce further evidence for the 
difference that the diligent and dynamic board can make. This builds on the work of board 
governance scholars from Mace18 onwards who have exposed the gap between the myths and 
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the realities of the work of boards, and the impact of minimalist and maximalist board 
practices.
There are a number of limitations in the empirical study on which this paper is based. 
These include a response rate from the national survey of board members of only 20%. This 
is mitigated by achieving 90% coverage of all acute and specialist hospitals in England, but it 
still means that we have to be cautious about drawing conclusions from the results. Second, 
there is not yet sufficient evidence to suggest that the sets of behaviours that we have 
described as being connected with certain board roles are complete or necessarily exclusive 
to those roles.
We would, nevertheless, consider that these insights constitute a work in progress towards 
a theoretical framework for healthcare boards. The utility of the classification of board roles 
of conscience, shock absorber, sensor, diplomat and coach requires further investigation. The 
sets of dyadic behaviours that we have proposed as being associated with these roles need 
further testing. Finally, an area of future research would be to investigate the impact of the 
composition of the board, including backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives of board 
members on how roles are taken up and behaviours are enacted. 
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Table 1: A realist perspective for effective healthcare boards with the main board 
theoretical purpose driving the dynamics (from Chambers et al. (2013))
Theory  about 
the purpose of 
the board
Contextual 
Assumptions
Mechanism Intended Outcome
Agency Low trust & high 
challenge & low 
appetite for risk
Control through 
intense internal and 
external regulatory 
performance 
monitoring
Minimisation of risk & 
good patient safety 
record
Stewardship High trust & less 
challenge & greater 
appetite for risk
Broad support in a 
collective leadership 
endeavour
Service improvement 
and excellence in 
performance
Resource 
dependency
Importance of social 
capital of the 
organisation
Boundary spanning 
and close dialogue 
with healthcare 
partners
Improved reputation 
and relationships
Stakeholder Importance of 
representation and 
collective effort; risk 
is shared by many
Collaboration Sustainable 
organisation, high 
levels of staff 
engagement
Board power Managerial 
hegemony; human 
desire for control
Use of power 
differentials
Equilibrium
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Table 2: Revised framework for effective healthcare board roles
Theory  about the 
purpose of the 
board
Contextual 
Assumptions
Roles and 
modes  of 
behaviour
Mechanism Intended 
Outcome
Agency
(holding 
management to 
account)
 
Low trust & 
high challenge 
& low appetite 
for risk
Board as sensor 
Challenging,  
supportive
Holding to 
account & 
control through 
intense internal 
& external 
performance 
monitoring
Minimisation of 
risk & good 
patient safety 
record
Stewardship
(supporting 
management)
 
High trust & 
less challenge 
& greater 
appetite for risk
Board as coach 
Collaborative, 
inquiring
Broad support in 
a collective 
leadership 
endeavour
Service 
improvement and 
excellence in 
performance
Resource 
dependency
(enhancing the 
reputation of the 
organisation)
 
Importance of 
social capital of 
the organisation
Board as 
diplomat 
Ambassadorial, 
curious
Boundary 
spanning and 
close dialogue 
with healthcare 
partners
Improved 
reputation and 
relationships
Stakeholder
(representing 
interests of all 
stakeholders) 
 
Importance of 
representation 
and collective 
effort; risk is 
shared by many
Board as 
conscience 
Listening, 
questioning
Collaboration Sustainable 
organisation, high 
levels of staff 
engagement
Board power
(reconciling 
competing 
interests)
 
Human desire 
for control
Board as shock 
absorber 
Courageous,  
probing
Use of power 
differentials
Equilibrium
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Figure 1: Research design
Patient &
Public
and
Expert 
Advisory Group
Phase 1: 
Literature review and stakeholder 
interviews (n=13, Autumn/Winter 
2015)
Phase 2: 
National survey of 
NHS board members 
(n=381, Spring 2016)
Phase 3: 
Six case studies: interviews (n=69); 
focus groups (n=8); meeting 
observations (n=16); survey of 
managers in 3 cases (n=85,37,70)  
(Summer 2016 – Spring 2017)
Phase 4: 
Analysis and synthesis 
(Spring/Summer 2017)
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Figure 2: Association between averages of board members’ self-reported emphasis on 
different purposes and the CQC Well-led rating for their Trust 
(Emphasis on each purpose scored 0-10, with anchor points: 1 = Hardly at all; 3 = A little; 5 
= Moderately; 7 = Quite a lot; 9 = Massively)
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Figure 3: Interconnectedness of roles, behaviours and outcomes of the dynamic 
healthcare board
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